Consider two search engines, A, B who run ad auctions for a particular string of keywords. We consider a game with incomplete information in which each advertiser selects strategically an ad auction to attend and how to bid in this auction and we prove that this game possesses an essentially unique symmetric equilibrium. Moreover, when A is stronger than B in the sense that its positions' click rates are point-wise higher than those in B it is proved that the expected revenue in A is greater than the one in B in this equilibrium. The result is proved in the standard symmetric independentprivate-value model and for regular ad auctions, where roughly speaking, a regular ad auction is one for which an appropriate revenue equivalence theorem makes it equivalent to a VCG ad auction. In contrast, a formula for the expected equilibrium revenue is given for the monopolistic setup in which there exists a single ad auction in the market. This formula reveals cases in which increasing the click rates may reduce the expected equilibrium revenue. In the monopolistic setup, our theorems are proved for a not necessarily symmetric model, and without any restriction on the distribution of types. Since the revenue equivalence principle is not useful for non-symmetric models, the theorems are proved only for VCG ad auctions. Nevertheless, the theorems are applied to next-price ad auctions used in practice without invoking this principle.
Introduction
[ITAI: In Feng, page numbers. In Mehta, page numbers.] Ad auctions 1 have become a central topic of study in economics, electronic commerce, and marketing (see, e.g., (Feng et al., 2007; Varian, 2007; Lahaie, 2006; Edelman et al., 2007; Borgs et al., 2007; Mehta et al., 2007; Athey and Ellison, 2007) ). This is mainly due to their popularity as the central advertisement tool adopted by major web companies. Roughly speaking, an ad auction can be modeled as a game with incomplete information, in which advertisers compete for positions on a web page, to be shown in association with the search of a particular string of keywords. The advertisers submit bids, and the ordering of their ads when a search for the corresponding string of keywords is conducted, is determined based on these bids; payments may depend on all advertisers' bids, and are defined as part of the particular auction specification.
The above setting provides important challenges for both auction designers and auction participants, leading to many useful studies. However, the current literature ignores the fact that similar ad auctions are held simultaneously by different web companies/search engines. That is, an advertiser has the ability to choose where to spend his money, in parallel to the decision of how to bid in the selected location. In this paper, we initiate research of this topic by considering two competing ad auctions. In our model of competition there are two stages, at the first stage each advertiser, after observing her type, chooses the probability for selecting each auction, namely the participation function. After the realization of the participation function, she chooses the bid. No information is revealed after the first stage, and therefore, for technical convenience the game is discussed as having only one stage in which each advertiser chooses a participation probability and two bids. Our model of competition is not the only reasonable one. One may consider two other potential models. In the first model, which is close in spirit to our model, the assumption that every bidder participates only in one auction is kept. However, the number of participants in each auction is revealed to all players after the selection part is over. We have not analyzed this model. At the second model, each bidder has a limited budget, and his strategic decision is how to split this budget amongst the auction. However, in reality, for particular keyword markets, advertisers often tend to concentrate on only one search engine. One reason for that is the burden advertisers have in running and managing their campaigns. Another reason arises from the lack of flexibility in copying campaign data from one search engine to another (see e.g. Edelman (2008) ). The competition is discussed within the standard symmetric independent-private-value model. Our results are proved for VCG ad auctions and explicitly extended to regular ad auction, where roughly speaking, a regular ad auction is one for which an appropriate revenue equivalence theorem makes it equivalent to a VCG ad auction. For VCG ad auctions, it is assumed that whatever auction is selected by a bidder, she reveals her true valuation in this auction. This assumption reduces the strategy set of every bidder to the set of participation functions. It is proved that the auction selection game has an essentially unique symmetric equilibrium, whose structure is analyzed. Particular examples are presented and discussed.
Search engines use ad auctions as one of their central revenue sources. Intuitively, one would expect that higher click rates will result in higher revenues. That is, what the company should care about is in providing an effective search engine, yielding high traffic to its site. Indeed, in our competing setup it is proved that when Auction A is stronger than Auction B, in the sense that the click rates in A are point-wise higher than those in B, in the essentially unique equilibrium, the expected revenue in A is higher than the expected revenue realized in B. However, this seemingly intuitive result is shown to be a consequence of the competition. We derive a formula for the expected revenue in a monopolistic setup, which reveals cases in which a stronger auction may yield less revenue! 2 In the monopolistic setup, our theorems are proved for a not necessarily symmetric model, and without any restriction on the distribution of types. Since the revenue equivalence principle is not useful for non-symmetric models, the theorems are proved only for VCG ad auctions. Nevertheless, the theorems are applied to next-price ad auctions 3 used in practice without invoking this principle. The application utilizes the pioneering papers of Varian (2007) and Edelman et al. (2007) , where the relationships between next-price ad auctions and VCG ad auctions is explored using theoretical and empirical tools. We extend our results and conclusions for the advertisers' selecting auction game to ad auctions with reserve prices. Our results generalize the results in Burguet and Sakovics (1999) , where the authors discussed the competition model used in this paper for two identical second-price single item auctions with potentially distinct reserve prices.
It is important to note that our paper does not discuss a strategic competition in auction design. It just opens the road for such a model. In general, such a competition is modeled as a two stage game, where at the first stage every auction organizer chooses the auction to conduct, and at the second stage each of the bidders decides which auction to attend and how to bid in this auction. Such an approach was taken in a restricted symmetric singleitem auction setup, e.g., in (Burguet and Sakovics, 1999) and in (Monderer and Tennenholtz, 2004) . However, as was already shown in (McAfee, 1993 ) the above two-stage game does not in general possess a sub-game perfect equilibrium even in the simple single-item setup. Even in setups in which existence of such an equilibrium was proved, it does not reveal interesting conclusions (see, e.g., the discussions in (Burguet and Sakovics, 1999) . Therefore, most of the literature ((McAfee, 1993; Peters, 1997; Peters and Severinov, 1997) ) on competition in auction design in the single-item setup dealt with a model with many auctions and derived results about the limit (partially strategic) behavior of the market, when the number of auctions' organizers and buyers is approaching infinity. This approach does not seem the right one in the ad auction market, where only a few auctions' organizers (search engines)
2 A relevant phenomenon was demonstrated for the VCG combinatorial auctions with complete information, where it was shown that higher valuations may reduce revenue. See, e.g., Rastegari et al. (2007) and its list of references.
3 Next-price ad auctions are also called generalized second-price ad auctions.
control the market. The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we define the basic model of ad auctions. In Section 3 we define the model of bidders' competition and present our main results for the VCG setup, the theorem about existence and essential uniqueness of symmetric equilibrium, and the theorem about revenue inequality. The existence and uniqueness theorem is proved in Section 4 followed by examples in Section 5. The theorem about revenue inequality is proved in Section 6. In Section 7 we define regular ad auctions and prove that our main theorems hold for them. Section 8 deals with the monopolistic setup, and in Section 9 we extend our results for bidders' competition to a setup with reserve prices.
Ad Auctions
There exist n advertisers, which we call bidders, n ≥ 2; A generic bidder is denoted by i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. In a ad auction there is a seller who offers for sale k positions, k ≥ 1; a generic position is denoted by j, 1 ≤ j ≤ k. As the seller cannot sell more positions than bidders, it is assumed that n ≥ k. The positions are sold for a fixed period of time. For each position j there is a commonly-known number α j > 0, which is interpreted as the expected number of visitors at that position; α j is called the click rate of position j. It is assumed that the positions have distinct click rates, and without loss of generality it is assumed that α 1 > α 2 > . . . > α k > 0. For convenience, we add a dummy position, position k + 1 with α k+1 = 0. From now on, unless otherwise specified, the term"position" includes the dummy position. Let K = {1, . . . , k} be the set of non-dummy positions, and let K d = K ∪ {k + 1} denote the set of positions.
Given the above environment, a ad auction is defined by an allocation rule and a payment scheme. Each bidder i is requested to submit a bid b i ∈ B i = [0, 1]. The set of bid profiles is denoted by B = B 1 ×· · ·×B n . Based on the profile of bids, the allocation rule determines the allocation of positions to the bidders. However, in this paper we consider only ad auctions for which the allocation rule is a welfare maximizer; that is, whenever bids are distinct, the bidder with the highest bid receives the first position, the second highest bidder receives the second position etc. Each bidder that does not receive a position j ∈ K is assigned to the dummy position, k + 1. Distinct welfare maximizers allocation rules differ in the tie-breaking rule they use. In this paper tie problems will be successfully avoided. However, for completeness, it is assumed that ties are resolved by the priority rule using the indices of the bidders; i < t implies that i has the priority over t, whenever they make the same bid. Hence, with this tie breaking rule there exists a unique allocation rule, which is a welfare 4 Our results hold for every tie breaking rule, including randomized ones. 
A payment scheme is a tuple p = (p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p n ), where for every i p i : B → R + is a nonnegative bounded Borel measurable function, which is called bidder i's payment function; That is, p i (b) is bidder i's payment per click when the bid profile is b. It is assumed that a bidder that bids 0 pays 0. Thus, the total payment of bidder i equals α s i (b) p i (b). Therefore, although the payment per-click for a bidder that gets the dummy position can be positive, his total payment equals 0 since α k+1 = 0. Given a fixed number of bidders, n, an ad auction with k non-dummy positions and a click rates vector α = (α 1 , . . . , α k ), which uses the welfare maximizer allocation rule and the payment scheme p = (p 1 , . . . , p n ) is denoted by G(k, α, p). In some discussions, some of the parameters in G(k, α, p) whose values are obvious are omitted.
If i holds a position, every visitor to this position gives i a revenue of v i ∈ [0, 1], where v i is called the valuation of i. An auction generates a Bayesian game after the utilities of the bidders and their distribution of valuations are specified. It is assumed that the bidders' utility functions are quasi-linear. That is, if bidder i is assigned to position j and pays p per click, his utility is α j (v i − p).
We use the independent-private-value model to model the distribution of valuations, that is each v i is privately observed by i, and it is drawn from the interval V i = [0, 1] according to a random variableṽ i , whose distribution function is F i ; The random variables,ṽ i are independent. At this point, and unless otherwise specified F i is not required to satisfy particular assumptions except for being a distribution function. That is, F i is a non-decreasing and right-continuous function on [0, 1] , and F i (1) = 1.
LetF denote the joint distribution of the bidders on V = V 1 × V 2 · · · × V n . Throughout the paper we use the standard notation regarding the subscript −i. E.g.,F −i denotes the joint distribution of all bidders except i. The Bayesian game generated by the ad auction G(k, α, p) and by the vector of distribution functions 
) be the expected utility of bidder i given that her valuation is v i and every bidder t uses the strategy d t . That is,
We are about to discuss special ad auctions. Before we do it, we need the following definition. For every vector of real numbers, x = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) we denote by (x (1) , x (2) , . . . , x (n) ) the unique permutation of the vector x for which x (1) ≥ x (2) ≥ · · · ≥ x (n) . For a bid profile, b, whenever convenient, we let b (j) = 0 for every j > n.
The big search engines use variants of the next-price ad auctions:
Definition 2.1 (Next-price ad auction) The ad auction G = G(k, α, p) is called the next-price ad auction if its payment scheme p is defined for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n as follows:
In this paper we mainly deal with the standard VCG ad auction.
Definition 2.2 (Standard VCG ad auction) The ad auction G = G(k, α, p) is called the standard VCG ad auction, or in short, the VCG ad auction, if its payment scheme p is defined for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n as follows:
In a non-standard VCG ad auction, every bidder may pay an additional amount depending only on the bids of the other bidders.
Competing Auctions -Main Results

Consider two ad auctions,
, and recall the assump-
In what follows, whenever necessary, it is assumed that α j = 0 for every j > k A and that β j = 0 for every j > k B . Auctions A and B form a game for the bidders 1, 2, . . . , n, denoted by H(A, B, F), where F is the vector of distribution functions. In this game each bidder simultaneously chooses one auction to participate in, and how to bid at each auction. Bidders can use mixed strategies to select an auction. We assume that a bidder can not attend both auctions. Since bidders can always guarantee a non-negative utility by bidding zero there is no harm in assuming that bidders always choose to participate in some auction. A strategy for a bidder i in H(A, B, F) is a tuple σ i = (q i , d i ), where
) is the participation strategy of i, and
) is the bidding strategy of i.
Note that a bidder's strategy includes her bid in an auction even if the probability of attending this auction is zero. This is consistent with the usual redundancy in the definition of strategies in game theory.
More precisely, q
Borel measurable function, is the probability that i will attend the auction L, L ∈ {A, B}. In particular, q
is the bidding strategy in auction L ∈ {A, B}, which is also assumed to be measurable.
Let Σ i be the set of strategies for bidder i. Denote by U H(A,B,F) i
(v i , σ 1 , . . . , σ n ) the expected utility for bidder i given that her valuation is v i and every bidder t uses the strategy σ t . A strategy profile σ = (σ 1 , . . . , σ n ) ∈ Σ 1 × · · · × Σ n is a Bayesian equilibrium in the game H(A, B, F) if for every bidder i and every v i ,
When dealing with the competing model, we derive our results for a symmetric model. That is, the distribution functions of all bidders are identical. If the common distribution function is F , the ad auction G(k, α, p, (F, F, . . . , F )) is denoted by G(k, α, p, F ) and the game H(A, B, (F, F, . . . , F )) is denoted by by H(A, B, F ). In a symmetric model it is natural to focus on symmetric strategies/equilibrium, and therefore we omit the bidder's index from strategies. Hence, we refer to a strategy of a bidder as a vector
Note that changing the participation function q of one of the bidders in a set with F −probability 0 of valuations v for which 0 < q A (v) < 1, does not change the utilities of any of the other bidders. This inspires the following definition:
VCG ad auctions, and let F be a distribution function. The game H(A, B, F ) possesses an essentially unique symmetric equilibrium if it posses a symmetric equilibrium and for every two symmetric equilibria q,q
Moreover, we will frequently assume that F is standard, where
, and it has a density, that is
We prove our main results for VCG ad auctions. In such case we naturally assume that the bidding strategy of each bidder is the truth-telling strategy. Hence, a strategy of a bidder in such case is determined by his participation strategy. We prove:
be VCG ad auctions and let F be a standard distribution function.
The game H(A, B, F ) possesses an essentially unique symmetric equilibrium. Moreover, If α 1 ≥ β 1 there exists a unique 0 ≤ v * ≤ 1 for which there exists a symmetric equilibrium, q = (q A , q B ) with the following properties:
Furthermore, v * = 0 if and only if α n ≥ β 1 , and v * = 1 if and only if α 1 = β 1 .
The condition α 1 ≥ β 1 in Theorem (3.3) is without loss of generality; Otherwise exchange the names of the auctions. In Section 4 we prove Theorem 3.3, and we provide tools for computing the cutting point v * and the values of the probabilities below v * . In Section 5 we apply the tools developed in the proof in order to explicitly find and discuss the equilibrium in special cases. Before we state our main theorem regarding revenues we need the following definition:
, and at least one inequality is strict.
be VCG ad auctions, and let F be a standard distribution function. If A is stronger than B, the expected revenue in A is greater than the expected revenue in B in the essentially unique symmetric equilibrium of the game H(A, B, F ).
Theorem 3.5 is proved in Section 6.
Proof of Theorem 3.3
Consider the game H(A, B, F ), where A and B are VCG auctions, and F is a standard distribution function, whose density is denoted by f . Without loss of generality assume that α 1 ≥ β 1 . If α n ≥ β 1 it means in particular that α n > 0 and therefore n = k A . In such case, for an arbitrary bidder i, independently of all other bidders' strategies, the maximal utility in B, β 1 v i does not exceed his minimal utility in A, α n v i , and we say that the competition is degenerate. We cover this trivial case in somewhat more details at Section 4.4. In our following proof of Theorem 3.3 we assume a non-degenerate competition. That is, α n < β 1 .
Preparations
Let q be a symmetric strategy. For an arbitrary bidder i let
That is,
When all other bidders but t use the strategy q, bidder t should compare his utilities in A and in B. When he computes his utility in A, he faces a random number of participants. Equivalently, bidder t can consider lack of participation in A as participation in A of a bidder with valuation 0. Hence, bidder i can assume that there exist exactly additional n−1 bidders in A such that the distribution function of each of them is F A q , where
Similarly, for auction B,
, and therefore
Denote by P A (v, q) (P B (v, q)) the expected total payment in A (B) experienced by a bidder with valuation v given that each of the other bidders uses the strategy q. Similarly, denote by Q A (v, q) (Q B (v, q)) the expected click rate in A (B), and denote by
Note that a bidder with valuation v obtains position j in auction A if there are exactly n − j other bidders each of whom has a lower valuation than v in A and there are exactly j − 1 bidders each of whom has a higher valuation than v in A, and that because ties have probability zero, the probability that the bidder obtains j and the above condition is not satisfied equals 0. Therefore,
Similarly,
We need the following proposition whose proof is standard in mechanism design theory. 
Proof:
We prove the proposition for L = A. 1. Let v, w ∈ [0, 1]. Because truthtelling is a dominant strategy for a bidder, bidding v when his valuation equals v yields at least as bidding w, that is, vQ
. Combining these inequalities yields
. Therefore, by the two inequalities we derived in part 1 of this proof, and by (7),
By (Rockafellar, 1970) this easily implies that U A (·, q) is a convex function, whose derivative equals Q A almost everywhere in [0, 1], and since U A (0, q) = 0, the required integral equality follows.
The following functions are extensively used in our proofs. For every 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 and every 0 ≤ y ≤ 1 letQ
and let
Note that by (8), (9), (5), and (6), for every 0 ≤ v ≤ 1,
and therefore
For a function φ(x, y) we denote by φ x , φ y the derivatives with respect to the first and second variable respectively. Similarly, if φ(x) is a function of one variable, φ x denotes the derivative of φ. The following technical lemma will be useful for us.
Consequently, (iv) Q x (x, y) > 0 for every x, y for which 0 < x+F (y) < 1 or [x+F (y) = 1 and 0 < x, y < 1].
(v) Q y (x, y) > 0 for every x, y for which 0 < x + F (y) < 1.
The equality (i) is obvious. (ii) Recall the standard convention that for nonnegative integers a < b,
where the last equality follows since
(n−1) and
(17) Assume 0 < x + y < 1, which implies, in particular, that both summands in RHS(17) are nonnegative. If n > k A , the first summand in RHS (17) is positive. If n = k A , k A ≥ 2, and since α j − α j+1 > 0 for every 1 ≤ j ≤ k A − 1, the second summand in RHS (17) is positive.
Therefore, RHS(17) > 0, which completes the proof of (ii). Note thatQ
whereQ is defined asQ A , except that we replace α j with β j for every relevant j and k A with k B . Therefore, (iii) follows from (ii).
Before we present our next proposition we present a variant of the Implicit Function Theorem needed in its proof: Theorem 4.3 (Implicit Function Theorem) Let F : E × J → R be a continuously differentiable function, where E and J are open intervals. and let (x 0 , y 0 ) ∈ E ×J be a point for which F (x 0 , y 0 ) = 0 and F x (x 0 , y 0 ) = 0. Then, there exists an open interval I = (y 0 −δ, y 0 +δ), δ > 0, and a unique function g : I → J such that g(y 0 ) = x 0 and F (g(y), y) = 0 for all y ∈ I. Moreover g is continuously differentiable on I and for every y ∈ I 2. There exists a unique function h : (0, v * ) → [0, 1] such that the following two conditions hold for every 0 < v < v * :
Moreover, this unique function denoted by h satisfies 0 < h(v) < 1 − F (v) for every 0 < v < v * .
3. h is continuously differentiable and 0 < − 
which completes the proof of this part. 
Therefore, by what we proved in the previous part of this theorem, g(y) = h(y) for every y in this smaller neighborhood of v. This implies that h is continuously differentiable in this smaller neighborhood of v, and in particular it is differentiable in v. By the Implicit Function Theorem,
By parts (iv) and (v) of Lemma 4.2, −h (v) > 0. It remains to prove that −
< 1. That is, we have to prove that
Note that Similarly, because h is decreasing and bounded from above in (0, v * ) the limit, lim v→0 h(v)
exists, and is denoted by h(0).
We end this subsection with the following useful lemma:
Lemma 4.5 
Existence
We defineq = (q A ,q B ) by definingq B as follows: The values,q B (0),q B (v * ) are left unspecified, and for other 0 < v ≤ 1q
In order to prove thatq is a symmetric equilibrium it suffices to prove the following two claims:
We first compute the function ϕ(v,q).
0. We will show that:
Indeed, if v = v * the proof is obvious since ϕ(v 
which proves (a). By Lemma 4.5, 
Uniqueness
Let q be a symmetric equilibrium. We first prove that:
Establishing (22) proves the essential uniqueness as follows: In the interval (v * , 1) a bidder in equilibrium must choose A, and therefore q B (x) = 0 =q B (x) for every x > v * . Considering the other interval, the derivative of
and In order to prove (22) we need the following technical lemma, the proof of which is standard and hence omitted. 
. By Lemma 4.6 it suffices to prove that there exists c < z < d for which φ(z) = 0. Assume in negation that such z does not exist. Therefore, either φ(v) > 0 for every c < v < d or φ(v) < 0 for every c < v < d. Without loss of generality φ(v) < 0 for every c < v < d. Note that since φ(v) < 0 for every v ∈ (c, d), q B (v) = 1 for every such v. Therefore,
Recall that by Lemma 4.1,
. Hence we have:
However, since q
Therefore there exists c < z < d for which φ(z) = 0. This completes the proof.
Recall that U
By continuity ,U A (d, q)−U B (d, q) = 0, and by Lemma 4.7,
, contradicting our negative assumption. Hence, in order to establish (22), it suffices to prove that d = v * . Before we do it, note that since However, since Q A , Q B are continuous, the equality holds everywhere, that is
Assume in negation that v
))dz < 0 contradicting. This completes the proof of uniqueness.
Degenerate Competition
Recall that the competition is degenerate when α n ≥ β 1 and that in such case n = k A .
In this case it can be easily seen that the strategy profile in which every bidder chooses A with probability 1 is in equilibrium. Indeed, If bidder i with valuation v i deviates to B he receives a utility of β 1 v i , while if he stays in A, his minimal utility equals α n v i . Therefore, the existence assertion follows by letting v
is a symmetric equilibrium and that ϕ(0, q) > 0, there exists 0 < c < 1 such that q B (c) 
Examples
In our first example we consider two ad auctions, each with two positions, that is,
2. In addition it is assumed that α 1 > β 1 > α 2 . When n = 2 the structure of equilibrium is revealed analytically.
By (12) and (13),
Recall that Q(x, y) =Q A (x, F (y))−Q B (x), and that v * is the unique solution of Q(0, v * ) = 1.
, the essentially unique equilibriumq satisfies:
Hence, bidders with high valuations participate with probability 1 in auction A, while a bidder with a low valuation randomizes and assigns a constant probability to each of the auctions at the interval (0, v * ). Note that if α 1 − α 2 > β 1 − β 2 ,
, that is, a bidder with a low valuation assigns a higher probability to the weaker auction.
When n = 2, the function h(v) is determined by a polynomial equation in h(v) of degree 1, and thereforeq B (v) is constant at the first interval. However, for n > 2, h(v) is determined by a polynomial equation of degree greater than 1, andq B (v) is not a constant function.
It is interesting to note thatq B (v) may be increasing or decreasing in (0, v * ). This is shown in the examples illustrated in Figures 1 and 2 , where the equilibrium is not analytically computed. In both examples n = 4 and k A = k B = 4 and F is the uniform distribution.
In Figure 1 6 Proof of Theorem 3.5
be VCG ad auctions such that A is stronger than B, and let F be a standard distribution function. Let R A (R B ) be the expected revenue in auction A (B) at the essentially unique symmetric equilibrium,q in H(A, B, F ). We have to prove that
In the rest of the proofq is fixed and therefore omitted from the description of the functions. By what we prove in Theorem 3.3 and by (7), P A (v) = P B (v) for every v ∈ [0, v * ], and because, in addition,
for such v, and therefore
dx, the second term in the right-hand-side of the last equality is a double integral. By changing the order of the integrals in this second term, and move to the parameter x, we get
We are about to apply the method of integration by parts to the right-hand-side of (28). For that matter let
We claim that the derivative Q A x (x) exists at each of the intervals (0, v * ) and (v * , 1) and it is bounded at each of these intervals, and that G(1) = 0. Therefore, by integration by parts
. It remains to show that G(1) = 0. Indeed, it is easily verified that G(x) = xF (x) + 2xϕ(x) − x for every 0 ≤ x ≤ 1. Hence, G(1) = 0. Since by what we showed above Q A x (x) > 0 except at most three values of x, in order to prove that ∆ < 0 it suffices to prove that
For every v * ≤ x < 1, G(x) = xF (x) − x < 0. So, it remains to prove (31) for 0 < x < v * .
In order to prove it we use the first time the fact that A is stronger than B. By re-arranging the terms in (31), we have to prove that
Let x ∈ (0, v * ) and leth(x) =
. Therefore, by (12) and (13)
andQ
follows.
Regular Ad Auctions
Consider two ad auctions A = G(k A , α, p A ) and B = G(k B , β, p B ), Our goal in this section is to provide conditions under which theorems 3.3 and 3.5 hold when A and B are not necessarily VCG ad auctions. Let q : [0, 1] → [0, 1] be a measurable function. For every standard distribution function F , regard q as a non-strategic participation function used by each of the n bidders in some ad auction. That is, q(v) is the probability that a bidder participates strategically in the bidding. For technical reasons, in order to keep the assumption that all bidders participate, whenever the realization implies that the bidder does not participate, it is modeled as if this bidder participates but his valuation equals 0. This forms a new ad auction in which the distribution function is
Let D = G(k, α, p) be an ad auction, and let F be a standard distribution function. For every q let D(q) = G(k, α, p, F q ) be the ad auction with F q . We say that D is a regular ad auction if for every standard distribution function F and for every participation function, q, D(q) possesses a symmetric equilibrium in which every bidder uses a bidding strategy, which is non-decreasing and equals an increasing function almost everywhere with respect to F q . That is, there exists an increasing strategy in [0, 1] which equals the equilibrium strategy almost everywhere with respect to F q . In particular, if F q is constant at a certain interval, the symmetric equilibrium is not necessarily increasing there.
Let
be regular ad auctions, and let F be a distribution function. When A and B are VCG ad auctions we reduce the strategy set of each bidder to the set of participation strategies by assuming that the bidding strategies are the truth-telling strategies. In general, we replace this assumption with the following one: A strategy for a bidder is a pair (q, d) in which d A is a symmetric equilibrium strategy in A(q A ), which is increasing almost everywhere with respect to the probability induced by F q A and d B is a symmetric equilibrium strategy in B(q B ), which is increasing almost everywhere with respect to the probability induced by F q B ; Note that because the bidding strategies are increasing, the expected click rate functions in H(A, B, F ) are precisely the expected click rate functions,Q A , Q B defined at (8) and (9). Moreover, Proposition 4.1 continues to hold with the same proof. 6 Therefore, the following theorem holds:
Theorem 7.1 Theorems 3.3 and 3.5 are valid for regular ad auctions.
The question of which auctions are regular is not dealt with in this paper. However we conjecture that the first-price and next-price ad auctions are indeed regular. In order to prove such results it is recommended to read (Lahaie, 2006) , where the existence and uniqueness of a symmetric equilibrium is proved for a first-price ad auction with a standard distribution function, F , but not for F q , and to read (Lebrun, 2006) , where equilibrium in first-price auctions (ad auctions with one position) are discussed for general distribution functions.
8 The Monopolistic Setup: Sensitivity Analysis of the Revenue Our main goal in this section is to derive the general formula for the expected revenue realized by the seller in the VCG auction, and to use it to show that the expected revenue of the VCG ad auction is not necessarily positively influenced by an increase of its click rates. For symmetric equilibria, these results can be extended via the revenue equivalence principle to regular ad auctions.
7 In addition, without any reference to the revenue equivalence theorem, these results are applied below to the most common model in the literature of ad auctions, which involves the next-price ad auction with complete information. Let A = G(k, α, p, F) be the standard VCG ad auction. Denote by R A = R(k, α, p, F) the expected revenue realized by the seller in A calculated under the assumption that every bidder uses the truth-telling strategy.
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In this section we address the natural question: Do more clicks or/and more positions yield more revenue?
Letṽ (t) be the t th reverse-order statistics generated by the random variablesṽ 1 , . . . ,ṽ n . In particular,ṽ (1) ≥ṽ (2) ≥ . . . ≥ṽ (n) . As is standard by now,ṽ (t) is identically zero for t > n. By (2), the expected total payment realized in position l equals
where E[·] is the expectation operator with respect to the joint distribution of profiles of valuations. Therefore,
7 See Section 7. 8 Recall that truth telling is a weakly dominant strategy for every bidder.
implying that
Hence, by (37), increasing all click rates by a positive multiplicative constant increases revenue by the same multiplicative constant. However, as is shown in the next theorem, if the click rates change in a non-linear way, the influence on the revenue is not necessarily positive.
Theorem 8.1 Let A = G(k, α, p, F) be the standard VCG ad auction with an arbitrary vector of distribution functions.
, is either non-decreasing or non-increasing in α j .
Proof: By (37)
which proves the theorem.
So, increasing the click rate of position 1 increases revenue. However, the influence of incresing/decreasing other positions' click rates on the revenue depends on the distribution of valuations. To complete the answer to question (35), note that adding a position is equivalent to increasing the click rate in the current dummy position. Hence, the value of such a policy depends on its effects on the other click rates and on the distribution functions.
In the following example we consider a special important case.
Example 1 (Symmetric model, uniform distribution) Consider the classical model in which, n > k, r = 0 and each F i is the uniform distribution over [0, 1] . In this model,
, and therefore, for j ≥ 2,
Hence, if for example n = 4 and k = 3, an increase of α 3 reduces the revenue.
Although the VCG ad auction is currently not used in practice, it may be used in the future because of its compelling feature of having dominant strategies. Furthermore, it was shown by Ashlagi et al. (2008) that a reliable mediator can transform the next-price ad auction, which is used in practice to a VCG ad auction, which makes the analysis of the VCG auction relevant. Moreover, Varian (2007) and Edelman et al. (2007) showed that with complete information, the VCG outcome is obtained in an equilibrium of the next-price ad auction. In addition, it was proved in (Edelman et al., 2007 ) that this equilibrium is locally envy-free, and in (Varian, 2007) it is claimed that this equilibrium is consistent with the empirical data. Hence, as we show in the next example, results about the revenue in the VCG auction can be used in real life.
Example 2 (Next-price auctions with complete information) In real life, auctions' organizers run variants of the next-price ad auction. This auction has the welfare maximizer allocation rule and its payment scheme is given in (1). In a model with complete information bidder i has a commonly known valuation v i , and without loss of generality it is assumed that
Varian (2007) and Edelman et al. (2007) proved that this game there exist multiple Nash equilibria, and that one of these equilibria generates the VCG outcome of this game. In addition, it was empirically claimed by Varian (2007) , that in real life the equilibrium that generates the VCG outcome is likely to be played. Hence, the revenue of the organizer is the same revenue obtained by one who is running a VCG ad auction. The VCG ad auction with complete information is a special case of the analysis we perform in this section in which the distribution F i gives probability 1 to v i . As in this case E[ṽ j+1 ] = v j+1 , the revenue in the next-price ad auction is given by the following formula:
Formula (39) enables one to determine the effects on the revenue of changing the click rates and/or adding/removing positions.
Reserve Prices
In this section we extend our results and conclusions for the advertisers' selecting auction game to ad auctions with reserve prices. Every ad auction may have a reserve price r, 0 ≤ r < 1, which is modeled as follows: The allocation rule allocates the non-dummy positions only to the bidders whose bid is at least r, and all other bidders receive the dummy position; A bidder's payment is calculated as if all other bidders whose bid is less than r bid r. An auction G(k, α, p) with a reserve price r is denoted by G(r, k, α, p). Obviously, G(0, k, α, p) is equivalent to G(k, α, p). possesses an essentially unique symmetric equilibrium if it posses a symmetric equilibrium and for every two symmetric equilibria q,q
The structure of symmetric equilibrium in H(r A , r B , A, B, F ) is described by an additional cutting point denoted by w * . 
If r B < r A :
Furthermore, v * = 0 if and only if α n ≥ β 1 , v * = 1 if and only if α 1 = β 1 , and w * = max{r A , r B } if and only if r A = r B .
Theorem 9.1 is proved in Subsection 9.1. Note that in the case in which α 1 > β 1 , α n < β 1 and r A < r B , the new parameter w * satisfies r B < w * , and a bidder with a valuation between r B and w * participate in A with probability 1. Hence, bidders with low valuations above the maximal reserve price and bidders with high valuations participate in A. Only bidders with interim size of valuations randomize. Such a phenomenon cannot happen when r A = r B , and in particular it cannot happen when both auctions do not have reserve prices. A typical structure of the equilibrium for the case in which r A < r B is illustrated in Figure 3 .
Regarding revenue, Theorem 3.5 is extended as follows: The proof of Theorem 9.2 is given in Subsection 9.2. Note one conclusion of Theorem 9.2: When the stronger auction sets a non strategic reserve price 0, even if the weaker auction sets an optimal reserve price, its expected revenue will be less than the one in A, that is, click rates are more influential for revenue than reserve prices; If auction B's organizer wishes to have a higher revenue than the one in A, she must improve her performance and provide better click rates. The definitions, theorems and proofs in Subsection 4.1 are valid for the setup with reserve prices with the following modifications: At the presence of reservation prices the formulas for the expected click rate functions are as follows:
Equalities (i) and (ii) in (15) continue to hold for v ≥ r A and v ≥ r B respectively, and
Finally, in part 3 in Lemma 4.5 one should require that the inequality holds for every v > max{v * , r A }.
Existence
We prove the result for the case in which r A ≤ r B . The proof for the other case is very similar and therefore it is omitted. Define a family of strategiesq w = (q 
where the function h is the unique function on [0, v * ] established in Proposition 4.4. Note thatq 0 coincides with the symmetric equilibrium,q of the game H(A, B, F ), except for at most three points. Moreover, by similar arguments to those applied in Subsection 4.2, for every
We argue thatq w * is a symmetric equilibrium. To show this, it suffices to prove the following three claims:
Therefore, the proofs for (a) and (b) use similar arguments to those used at the analogous proofs in Subsection 4.2. We proceed to prove (c).
and
Suppose that
By Proposition 4.1, (48) and (50) Therefore, by Proposition 4.1 we obtain that U A (v,q w * ) ≥ U B (v,q w * ), which completes the proof of part (c).
Uniqueness
We prove thatq w * is essentially unique for the case r A ≤ r B . The case in which r A > r B is similar. Let q be a symmetric equilibrium. As in the uniqueness proof for the case with no reserve prices (see Subsection 4.3), it is enough to show that 
We deal first with the simple case r B ≥ v * . Note that U A (r B , q) ≥ U B (r B , q). Therefore 
By similar arguments to the case with no reserve prices and by (52), we have Lemma 9.5 (a) U A (v, q) > U B (v, q) for every r A < v < t.
(b) U A (v, q) = U B (v, q) for every min{t, v * } < v < v * .
(c) U A (v, q) > U B (v, q) for every v > max{t, v * }.
Since q is an equilibrium, t ≥ r B . Hence, by Lemma 9. 
where in this case G(x) = 
As in the proof of Theorem 3.3, Q x (v) > 0 for every r A < v < v * . It remains to show that G(x) < 0 for every r A < x < v * , which is equivalent to proving that ϕ(x,q w * ) < 1 − F (x) 2 for every r A < x < v * .
We showed (see (32))in the case with no reserve prices that ϕ(v,q) < 1−F (x) 2 for every 0 < x < v * . Since ϕ(v,q) ≥ ϕ(v,q w * ), (56) follows.
